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OH CANADA!:
ANTITRUST GEOGRAPHIC MARKET
DEFINITION AND THE REIMPORTATION
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
Abstract: In recent years, public attention has focused on the need for
affordable prescription drugs. Although Congress has recently enacted a
Medicare Prescription Drug Plan, many private citizens and state and
local governments continue to reimport prescription drugs from Canada
to take advantage of the lower drug prices available in Canada. Many
pharmaceutical companies have responded to this phenomenon by
cutting off supplies of their drugs to Canadian pharmacies engaging in
reituportation. As a result, some state and local governments have initi-
ated litigation alleging state antitrust violations. This Note addresses one
of the first questions raised in U.S. antitrust litigation under the Rule of
Reason—the definition of the geographic market. First, this Note surveys
the current caselaw standard and the academic approaches to geographic
market definition. This Note then applies these approaches, concluding
that Canada may be included in any geographic market when addressing
the legality of reimportation in an antitrust context.
INTRODUCTION
Although global drug manufacturing companies with operations
in the United States ship and sell their products all over the world,
including Canada, certain drug manufacturing companies have re-
cently threatened to reduce their drug supplies to Canadian distribu-
tors because the distributors are redirecting the products to U.S. con-
sumers) For example, in a letter dated January 14, 2005, Merck & Co.
officials threatened to block supplies of their drugs to Canadian
pharmacies that continued to directly or indirectly sell Merck prod-
ucts to U.S. residents. 2 Other pharmaceutical companies, such as
Pfizer, AstraZeneca International, and Wyeth have also stated similar
in ten tions.3
Merck Tightens Sales to Canada, BOSTON ClAiE, Jan. 20, 2005, at C2, available al
http://www.boston.com/yourlife/health/diseases/articles/2005/01/20/merck_tightens_
salestocanada/.
2 Id.
3 Id.
1027
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The present trend of levying supply threats to Canadian pharma-
cies and wholesale suppliers comes in the wake of continued evidence
that numerous U.S. customers are turning to Canada, rather than to
domestic suppliers, to purchase their prescription drugs. 4 This prac-
tice has come to be known as reimportation, as it involves individuals
purchasing prescription drugs made in the United States that are sent
to Canada and then brought back into the United States. 5 The allure
of reimportation lies in the differing pricing structures for prescrip-
tion drugs in the United States and other countries.8 Because of the
Canadian government's price regulations, prices for the same pre-
scription drugs are often thirty to fifty percent cheaper in Canada
than in the United States.? Drug manufacturers' recent threats are an
effort to stem the flow of drugs across the Canadian border and back
into the United States. 8 For pharmaceutical companies, the continued
supply of the Canadian market, which is one-twentieth the size of the
United States market and regulated at lower prices, could lead to the
loss of billions of dollars in U.S. sales without any comparable gains. 9
Although levying threats to Canadian suppliers might seem to be
a rational business practice for the drug companies, such behavior
could create potential antitrust liability; if such actions are shown to
be an unreasonable restraint on trade that lack any redeeming vir-
tue—and, more importantly, if such actions can be reached by U.S.
antitrust laws.") In fact, the Minnesota Attorney General is currently
4 HUIS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMP., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTII & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT
ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION 11-12 (2004).
5 Id, at 3.
6 See DAVID GROSS, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES IN CANADA 11-14 (AARP Pub. Poly
Inst., Issue Brief, 2003), available at http://www.allhealth.org/recent/audio_07-22-04/
ib62_can_rx.pdf.
7 Id.
8
 See Merck Tightens Sales to Canada, supra note 1, at C2.
9 John E. Calfee, The High Price of Cheap Drugs, VIIKLy. STANtin.Rn, July 2l, 2003, at 20,
21, available at http://www.weeklystandard.corn/Con
 tent/Public/Ar ticles/ 000/ 000/
002/879
.Paia.asP'
19 See Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2005). Antitrust liability would
stem from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which prohibits agreements that unreasonably
restrain trade:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
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seeking to obtain internal documents from GlaxoSmithKline in rela-
tion to the office's investigation of such conduct as a potential viola-
tion of Minnesota's state antitrust laws." One potential allegation is
that. GlaxoSmithKline engaged in vertical restraints—between firms at
different levels in the production and distribution network, such as
between a wholesaler and retailer—in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act." Alternatively, drug companies could also be
exposed to antitrust liability if they colluded with each other, as a
horizontal restraint, to stop the importation of drugs from Canada by
collectively threatening to cut off supplies to Canadian distributors. 13
Such actions could constitute a concerted refusal to deal, also known
as a group boycott, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." In
seeking documents from GlaxoSmithKline, the Minnesota Attorney
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said pun-
ishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id. The underlying purpose of U.S. antitrust laws is to promote and protect competition.
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTEERUST 1,AW: AN ANALYSIS or ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1 100 (2d ed. 2000). Optimal competition occurs
when market price equals manufacturers' marginal costs. Id. Thus, optimal competition
exists when the market reaches equilibrium. Id. Market equilibrium is achieved when mar-
ket supply equals market demand. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTI-
TRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 51-54 (5th ed. 2004).
11 See generally In re GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 699 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. 2005).
12 See Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1; N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958)
(prohibiting the defendant's tying arrangement, which required lessees or grantees of its
land to ship all commodities produced on the land over the defendant's railroad lines);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152-55 (1951) (prohibiting refusals to
deal as violating section 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act): Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911) (prohibiting resale price maintenance, also known
as vertical price restrictions, as per se illegal because such agreements, "having for their
sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the
public interest and void"). An example of a vertical restraint is when a manufacturer limits
distributors to an exclusive territory or allocates customers to distributors, thereby pre-
cluding the distributors from selling outside their designated areas or to customers of an-
other distributor. See Conel T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (holding
a franchise agreement between a manufacturer of television sets and a retailer, which
barred the retailer from selling franchised products from locations other than those
specified in the agreement, to be an unreasonable restraint of trade as analyzed under the
Rule of Reason).
13 See Kim's Inc., v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 208-09 (1959) (conclud-
ing that a horizontal refusal to deal, or group boycott, existed, based on the fact that
manufacturers and distributors had conspired with each other).
14 See United States v. Socony-Vactunn Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (reaffirming
the idea that horizontal price fixing is per se illegal). If so, concerted collusion would raise
additional section 1 concerns as an example of a horizontal restraint—agreements be-
tween competitors within a market. Id.; see also ABA SECTION OF ArrrrrausT Law, ANTI-
TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 104 (4th ed. 1997).
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General has claimed there is some evidence of collusion among the
major pharmaceutical companies. 15
Assuming evidence exists either of collective involvement by drug
companies in limiting supplies to Canadian markets or of particular
drug companies engaging in vertical territorial restraints by prohibit-
ing distributors from selling to particular categories of customers,
such actions still do not violate antitrust laws under the Rule of Rea-
son analysis unless they have an anticompetitive effect.I 6
 . Before a
court can analyze whether such actions have an anticompetitive effect,
the court must define the geographic market that is potentially af-
fected by drug manufacturers' actions. 17
 This Note argues that the
nature of the pharmaceutical industry requires courts analyzing anti-
trust claims against drug manufacturers to define the relevant geo-
graphic market to include Canada and the United States."' If courts
determine the pharmaceutical companies violated antitrust laws, then
drug manufacturers would have to discontinue the challenged prac-
tice—in this case the horizontal collective refusal to deal with Cana-
dian pharmacies or the vertical territorial restrain ts. 19
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the present status
of the prescription drug industry in the United States and Canada,
including their respective pricing schemes. 20 Part I also outlines some
of the trends in consumption of prescription drugs by the U.S. market
15 America's Seniors, Today'sSeniorsNetwork.com, Documents Show Glaxo Antitrust
Violations, Attorney General Hatch Says (Dec. 15, 2004), http://todaysseniorsnetwork.
com/ghoco_evidence.htm . In the state's appeal after a trial court initially decided the
documents had to remain confidential, the Minnesota Attorney General argued that
"[title 45 documents at issue .. , contain direct evidence of unlawful concerted action by
GSK and other drug companies to block the importation of prescription drugs from Can-
ada." Id.
16 See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (explaining
that the Rule of Reason is limited to whether the restraint "is one that promotes romped-
tion or one that suppresses competition").
17 See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 215-328 and accompanying text.
16 See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (holding a horizontal re-
fusal to deal, evinced by an agreement between dentists and insurance companies, was
illegal under section 1); Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eners, 435 U.S. at 691-95 (holding that a pro-
fessional association's canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding was illegal under
section 1); Court TV, Inc., 433 U.S. at 46 (holding that a manufacturer's territorial restric-
tions on retailers were illegal under section 1). The term "horizontal" refers to agreements
among actual or potential competitors, AttEEDA HovENRAmP, supra note 10, Z 1901b,
whereas the term "vertical" refers to agreements among those in different levels of the
chain of production, such as producers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers. Id.
11902d.
2° See infra notes 29-77 and accompanying text.
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in comparison to the worldwide market. 21 Part II begins by providing
an overview of the antitrust legal framework. 22 Part II then surveys
three main theoretical approaches to geographic market definition in
antitrust. law. 25 This Part also illustrates how the federal courts utilize
each of these approaches. 24 Finally drawing on this background, Part.
III argues that courts should include Canada as part of the relevant.
geographic market in antitrust litigation arising when pharmaceutical
companies limit drug supplies to Canadian pharmacies that partici-
pate in reimportation to U.S. customers. 25 Thus, the relevant geo-
graphic market for antitrust purposes should consist of at least Can-
ada and the United States, with the possibility of expansion to a
worldwide scale. 26 By this argument, the pharmaceutical companies'
refusal to deal with Canadian wholesalers and distributors could con-
stitute action violative of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, either as a
horizontal or vertical restraint of trade. 27 Without the inclusion of
Canada into an antitrust analysis, the geographic market would be
limited to the United States—precluding oversight of drug manufac-
turers' potentially anticompetitive behavior. 28
I, PRESENT STATUS OF THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG INDUSTRY
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
A. Spending, Price, and Prescription Drug Markets
In the modern global community, the pharmaceutical industry
has undergone a series of dramatic changes. 29 For example, several
large-scale international mergers have created global drug compa-
nies." Despite the expanded reach of drug manufacturing compa-
nies, these companies have narrowed their focus to the U.S. markets
21 See infra notes 31-42,50, and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 96-195 and accompanying text.
21 Ste infra notes 96-195 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 215-328 and accompanying text.
26 Ste infra notes 215-328 and accompanying text.
27 See bid. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459 (1986) (holding that a horizontal refusal to
deal between dentists and insurance companies was illegal under section 1); Con!? T V,
Inc., 433 U.S. at 46 (holding that a manufacturer's territorial restrictions on retailers were
illegal under section 1).
2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10,1 530a.
29 ROY LEVY, FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE PEIARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A DtscussioN or
COMPEITEIVE AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN AN ENVIRONMENT or CHANGE. 37-38 (1999).
30 Id.
1032	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:1027
as a major source of overall revenue and profits generation 3u
 The
U.S. share of drug makers' worldwide revenues rose from almost one-
third of global revenues in 1996 to almost one-half in 2002—an in-
crease of fifty percent.32 Sales in the United States were roughly
ninety-five percent of the North American total." Attempting to capi-
talize on this reality, the global drug manufacturers have adopted a
global perspective to their businesses. 34 The pharmaceutical compa-
nies' reliance on global business plans is most evident in two aspects
of their businesses: their financing structure of research and devel-
opment for new drugs, and their global structure for manufacturing
drugs. 35
 With the U.S. drug market now comprising one-half of the
drug manufacturers' total revenues, the pharmaceutical industry re-
lies on U.S. revenues to support the expensive process of researching
and developing new drugs for use throughout the world."
While pharmaceutical companies reaped greater profits from the
U.S. market in the late 1990s, U.S. consumers also found themselves
spending more and more on prescription drugs.37 Between 1990 and
2003, spending on prescription drugs by the U.S. public increased
31
 ALAN SAGER & DE:BORAH SOCOIAR, HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM, LOWER U.S. PRE-
SCRIPTION DRUG PRICES ARE VITAL 'FO font PATIENTS AND DRUG MAKERS —RUT INSTEAD,
U.S. PRICES HAVE BEEN RISING RAPIDLY RELATIVE TO THOSE IN OTHER WEALTHY NATIONS
5-6 (2003), http://dcc2.buinc.biLedu/hs/pdfs/Lower%20drug%20prices.pdf  (revealing
that U.S.-generated revenues for drug manufacturers during the period from 1996 to 2002
increased from 34.7% to 50.8%).
32 Id. at 6.
" Id. at 5.
s" See, e.g., Lisa McTigue Pierce, Building a Solid GlaxoStnithKline: Corporate Prone, Foot)
& DRUG PACKAGING, Dec. 2004, at 22, 25-26, available at lutp://www.agile.com/news/
2004/fooddrugpack_122004.pdf (quoting GlaxoSmithKline representatives as stating they
have a "global" manufacturing and packaging outfit); Careers with Pfizer Global Manufac-
turing (PGM), More About PGM: Manufacturing Plants, hup://wwiv.pfizeccom/subsites/
pgm/more/mn_plants.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2005) (describing its global manufactur-
ing plants).
55 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 34, at 22, 25-26 (quoting GlaxoSmithKline representa-
tives as having a "global" manufacturing and packaging outfit); Careers with Pfizer Global
Manufacturing (PGM), supra note 34 (describing Pfizer's global manufacturing plants).
36 SAGER & SOCOLAR, supra note 31, at 5-6 (estimating that drug manufacturers secure
about two-thirds to three-fourths of their profits front U.S. citizens and that some industry
sources have found drug manufacturers' investment in research and development to be
roughly equal to their U.S. profits). In fact, drug manufacturers' reliance on the U.S. market
for providing the pharmaceutical industry with the sufficient funds to maintain current levels
for research and development of new drugs is one of the main justifications provided by the
industry for the price differentials. PHARM. RESEARCII & MFRS. OF AM., THE MINNESOTA AT-
TORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON PHARMACEUTICALS: CORRECI1NG THE RECORD 2-3 (2003),
available at It ttp:/ /www.ph rma.org/ publ ications/polic-y/2003-10-31.862.pdf.
37
 SAGER & SOCOLAR, supra note 31, at 4-5.
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almost five-fold, from $40.3 billion to $189.1 billion,38 The reasons for
this increase are varied, ranging from higher prices on existing drugs,
the introduction of new drugs with high retail prices, and changes in
the rate of drug usage.39
In addition to increased domestic spending on prescription drugs,
U.S. consumers also pay higher prices than do foreign consumers for
the same pharmaceutical products.° The fundamental cause of pricing
differentials between the U.S. market and other foreign markets relates
to the respective countries' wholesale drug pricing systems.'" In other
industrialized countries, such as Canada and European Union nations,
the national governments regulate the wholesale price charged by the
drug manufacturers.42 For example, in Canada, the national Patented
Medicine Prices Review Board (the "PMPRB") regulates the prices of
patented drugs.° The PMPRB establishes the maximum prices that
drug manufacturers can charge in Canada for their patented drttgs. 44
To arrive at. the wholesale price for each drug, the PMPRB considers
several factors, including the median price charged in other specified
industrial countries and a comparison of price increases to the Cana-
dian Consumer Price Index (the "CPI"). 45 In addition to setting a target
wholesale price, the PMPRB also polices the wholesale prices that drug
manufacturers quote to wholesalers, hospitals, and pharmacies, in an
effort to ensure that the price is not excessive in comparison to the
PMPRB's calculated price. 45
38 Id. at 4.
39 Id. at 5.
40 Id.
41 See SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., 108 .rn CONG., THERE. IS A BETTER WAY TO
HELP U.S. CONSUMERS: PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS ABROAD: AN UNFAIR TRADE
PoticY 5 (Comm. Print 2003), available at lutp://rpc.senate.gov/_files/hc110603.pdf,
42 Id.
43 Patented Medicine Prices Review Board Website [hereinafter PMPRB Website], About
the PMPRB, Mandate and Jurisdiction, http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/english/view.asp?x=
175&mp=87 (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
41 PMPRB Website, supra note 43, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.pmprb-
cepmb.gc.ca/english/view.asp?x=272#1 (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
43 Id. CPI is the measure of consumer goods and services. Prescription Drug Coverage for
Seniors: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Commerce, Subcomm. on Health and Environment,
106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of the American Academy of Actuaries), available at
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/medicare/rxstatement.pdf . In the United States, the CPI
increased 2.3 percent between 1989 and 1999. Id. In comparison, the CPI for prescription
drugs and medical supplies increased 5.9 percent during the same period. Id.
48 PMPRB Website, supra note 43, About the PMPRB, Mandate and Jurisdiction,
littp://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/english/Viewasp?x=175&mp=87 (last visited Sept. 16,
2005).
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In the United States, however, Congress simply requires each
drug manufacturer to report their average wholesale price (the
"AWP") to third-party compilers, such as the Drug Topics Red Book,
American Druggist First Database Annual Director of Pharmaceuticals, or
the Essential Director of Pharmaceuticals (Blue Book), which in turn report
AWP data for use by healthcare professionals, Medicare, and Medicaid
for reimbursement calculations. 47 Each prescription drug's AWP rep-
resents the average price at which manufacturers sell drugs to physi-
cians, pharmacies, and other customers. 48 Despite its name, however,
the AWP is not an accurate reflection of actual market prices for
drugs; rather, it is a price derived from self-reported manufacturer
data for both patented and generic drugs, with no external oversight
or determination that such prices accurately reflect drug manufactur-
ers' actual costs. 49 There are no governmental requirements or indus-
try-wide conventions requiring the AWP to reflect the price of any ac-
tual sale of drugs by a manufacturer." Thus, according to the U.S.
Government Accountability Office, the AWP may be neither "average"
nor "wholesale."51
In a recent investigation, the U.S. Department of Justice (the
"DOT") and the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units
further debunked the illusion of accurate wholesale price reporting. 52
By comparing actual wholesale pricing information, based upon whole-
salers' price lists, with the AWP price reported by the drug manufactur-
ers, investigators found numerous instances in which the AWP price was
considerably higher than the actual wholesale price."
The study's findings of inflated pricing were utilized in 2003, in
In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, when the
47 DAWN M. GENCARELLI, AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICE FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IS
THERE A MORE APPROPRIATE PRICING MECHANISM? 2-3 (Nat'l Health Policy Forum, Issue
Brief No. 775, 2002), available at http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/lB775%5FAWP%5F6%
2D7%2D02%2Epdf.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 3.
59 Id.
91 Medicare Part B Drugs: Program Payments Should Reflect Market Prices: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 2 (2001) (testimony of William J. Scanlon, Director,
Health Care Issues), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011142t.pdf.
52 See Reimbursement and Access to Prescription Drugs Under Medicare Part B: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Finance Comm., 107th Cong. 7 (2002) (testimony of
Thomas Scully, Administrator, Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services), available at
http://finance.senategov/hearings/testimony/031402tstest.pdf.
ss
20051	 A Geographic Maritet for Presciiption Drug Reimportation 	 , 1035
U.S. District Court of Massachusetts evaluated a class action complaint
alleging fraud and violation of section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust.
Act." The complaint detailed specific discrepancies between the ac-
tual wholesale price, as calculated by the DOJ, and the AWP indicated
by the drug manufacturer. 55 At times, the data revealed the drug
manufacturer's AWP was thousands of percentage points higher than
the DOJ-calculated wholesale price.%
This difference between the AWP and the actual wholesale price,
also known as the "spread," allows drug manufacturers to realize
profits in the United States that elude them in other markets, where
governmental regulations force drug manufacturers to charge whole-
sale prices closer to actual cost, thereby decreasing the spread in
those markets. 57 As a result, U.S. consumers face higher retail costs for
prescription drugs than do foreign consumers whose governments
prevent such pricing abuses—giving U.S. consumers reason to view
reimportation as a way to benefit from the lower prices charged in
foreign countries. 58
The increased U.S. demand for prescription drugs, coupled with
higher relative prices as compared to other countries, has led the U.S.
public to seek means of obtaining cheaper prescription drugs from
foreign countries.59 One approach taken by U.S. consumers is to pres-
sure their state and local governments to propose legislation and
policies allowing for reimportation; slate and local communities, such
as Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, and Springfield, Massa-
chusetts, have already proposed measures to establish drug reimporta-
54 Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2005); Complaint'['[ 699-704, in
re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 263 F. Stipp. 2d 172 (D. Mass. 2003) (No.
1456, Civ.A. 01-12257-PBS).
55 Complaint, supra note 54 11[ 187, 208, 260, 280, 293, 31L 323, 336, 343, 353, 359,
371, 415, 431, 466, 501, 534.
56 Id. It 187, 208, 280, 311, 466, 501, 534.
57 See SENATE REPURLICAN POLICY Comm., supra note 41, at 5.
58 Id.
59 See e.g., Lindsay McLaughlin & Brian Davidson, An Injury to One Is an Injury to All:
Drug &importation, ILWU WARRIOR 2004 (Intl Longshore & Warehouse Union, AFL-CIO,
S.F., Cal.) July 9, 2004, http://www.ilwu.org/political/warrior/04/vol4no5.cfm (urging
members to pressure their senators to take action on drug reimportation legislation); &-
importation Update: HITS Report Released, Grasslcy Plans to Reintroduce Legislation, Hearing to be
Held on Dorgan/Strome Bill, HOTLINE NEWSLETTER (Society for Women's Health Research,
D.C.), Jan. 2005, http://www.womenshealthresearch.org/policy/hodine0105.1nm [here-
inafter Reimportation Update] (quoting Sen. Grassley as stating, "'American consumers are
demanding lower prices on prescription drugs ....'").
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don programs for state employees and retirees. 60 Meanwhile, another
approach taken by U.S. consumers is to reimport prescription drugs
personally" Typically, these individuals obtain these prescription
drugs either by physically traveling across the border or by ordering
from online Canadian pharmacies.° The majority of reimported
drugs are mailed from Canada into the United States, with recent es-
timates placing the total volume at approximately twelve million pre-
scription drug products, valued at approximately $700 million in 2003
alone.° Additionally, about the same amount of prescription drugs
enter the United States from the rest of the world through mail and
courier services offered by traditional Canadian pharmacies." In re-
cent years, estimates suggest that up to one million Americans a year
travel across the border to purchase their prescription drugs from
Canada for a fraction of the U.S. domestic price. 65
go William M. Welch, Once Just a Trickle, Canada's Rx Drugs Pouring into USA, USA Tor
DAY, Oct. 7, 2003, at 1A, available at hup://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-10-06-
canada-drugs-usat_x.htm.
61
 COLIN BAKER, WOULD PRESCRIPTION DRUG IMPORTATION REDUCE U.S. DRUG SPEND-
ING? 1 (Cong. Budget Office, Econ. & Budget Issue Brief, 2004), available at http://
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5406/04-29-PrescriptionDrugs.pdf. More than one million
U.S. customers are buying prescription drugs from Canada and other foreign markets via
the Internet or by physically traveling there. Joan Indian Rigdon, Why Do Prescription Drugs
Cost So Much?, WASHINGTON LAWYER, Dec. 2004, at 22, 24, available at http://www.cichar.
org/for_lawyers/washington_lawyer/december_2004/drugs.cfm.
62 See HFIS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMP., supra note 4, at 11-12 (stating that in 2003,
about $408 million of the total prescription drug sales to U.S. consumers from Canada was
derived from Internet pharmacy sales, while the remaining $287 million was due to per-
sonal travel). Many Canadian online pharmacies actively cater to U.S. consumers by allow-
ing a consumer to place an order that will be delivered to the consumer's home simply by
inputting a drug name and quantity and filling out an order form. See generally Canada
Pharmacy Home Page, hup://www.canadapharmacy.com
 (last visited Sept. 17, 2005); Ca-
nadian Pharmacy Trust Home Page, hup://www.canadianpharmacytrust.com
 (last visited
Sept. 17, 2005); CanadaRX Home Page, littp://www.canadarx.com
 (last visited Sept. 17,
2005). Recent speculation has suggested that the Canadian government may alter its do-
mestic laws to prohibit individuals from receiving prescription medication unless they have
first met with a Canadian doctor. Joel B. Finkelstein, Drug &importation Situation Is Shifting
as Canada Could Cut Availability, Am. MEn. NEws (Am. Med. Ass'n, Chi., III.), Jan. 24, 2005,
at 5, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/01/24/gvsa0124.htm . If so,
then those currently reimporting prescription drugs via the Internet may loose their cur-
rent sources. Id.
63 See I-1 HS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMP., supra note 4, at 11-12.
84
 See id. at 12.
65 Pharmaceutical Reimportation from Canada: Hearing Before the House Gov't Reform Sub-
comm. on Wellness and Human Rights, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical &im-
portation from Canada] (statement of Vermont's U.S. Rep. Bernie Sanders), available at
Imp://been ie.house.gov/statements/20030403171059.asp.
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B. Prescription Drugs Under the Federal Antitrust Statutory Framework
The pricing structure of pharmaceutical companies in the U.S.
market has spurred both political and social outrage and consumer at-
tempts to circumvent U.S. pricing. 66 To impose legal antitrust liability
for the companies' behavior, however, courts must first determine that
the pharmaceutical companies engaged in conduct that unlawfully re-
strains trade. 67 As mentioned previously, such conduct could take the
form either of a horizontal collective agreement among all the phar-
maceutical companies to refuse to deal with Canadian wholesalers who
sell to U.S. customers, or of a vertical refusal deal in which each com-
pany independently refuses to deal with particular Canadian wholesal-
ers who sell to U.S. customers. 68
Although a classic horizontal group boycott is traditionally deemed
per se illegal under U.S. caselaw interpreting the Sherman Act, modern
courts have narrowed the per se category in favor of applying a Rule of
Reason analysis. 69 Furthermore, vertical territorial restraints are ana-
Rigdon, supra note 61, at 22, 24, 27.
67 See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof"' Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (stating
that under the Rule of Reason, courts will determine whether the restraint. "promotes
competition or [is] one that suppresses competition"); see also Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med.
Affiliates, 72 F.3d 1538, 1552 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[t] he rule of reason analysis is
concerned with the actual or likely effects of defendants' behavior, not with the intent
behind that behavior"); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 969 (10th Cir. 1994)
(finding intent alone insufficient to invoke antitrust laws). See generally Found, for Interior
Design Educ. Research v. Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that without proof of an antitrust injury, malicious intent alone is an insufficient
basis for antitrust liability).
Sec FTC v Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (holding that the hori-
zontal refusal to deal by a group of dentists with insurance companies was illegal under
section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Coral T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 46 (1977) (holding that a manufacturer's territorial restrictions on retailers were illegal
tinder section I).
69 Compare United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145 (1966) (holding an
agreement between a car manufacturer and dealers to refuse to deal with discount dealers
was per se illegal), and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)
(holding an agreement among retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers to refuse to deal
with retail competitor was per se illegal), with Nw. Wholesaler Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Sta-
tionery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985) (holding the Rule of Reason applied to a
wholesale purchaser cooperative's decision to expel a member), and Ind, Fed'n of Dentists,
476 U.S. at 459-65 (holding the "quick look" Rule of Reason applied to a refusal to deal
with insurance companies on the part of a group of dentists). The Court has stated that
horizontal refusals to deal will remain per se illegal if the boycotting party "possesses mar-
ket power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition." Nut. Whole-
salers Stationers, 472 U.S. at 296.
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lyzed under the Rule of Reason as well." Thus, regardless of whether
drug manufacturers are targeted under antitrust statutes for collectively
refusing to deal with Canadian distributors or for imposing vertical ter-
ritorial restraints, courts will most likely engage in a Rule of Reason
analysis."
Essentially, the Rule of Reason analysis seeks to determine
whether the restraint's anticompetitive effects substantially outweigh
the procompetitive justifications offered by the defendant. 72 In most
Rule of Reason cases, the plaintiff must prove that the identified re-
straint is likely to have a substantial, adverse impact on competition,
as indicated through a market analysis of the restraint's effects." Such
market analysis begins with a definition of the relevant market to de-
termine the relative impact of the contested action on the overall
market." In the antitrust context, the relevant market is defined from
two perspectives: the market for the product and the geographic mar-
ket." The remainder of this Note describes the differing approaches
to defining geographic markets and then applies these approaches to
the issue of reimportation of prescription drugs." The Note con-
cludes that Canada should be included as part of any geographic
market considered in an antitrust claim against drug manufacturers
operating in the U.S. 77
7U See Cont'l TV., Inc., 433 U.S. at 57-59 (holding the Rule of Reason applied to vertical
non price restraints).
71 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. This Note does not discuss the "quick
look" Rule of Reason, in which the plaintiff does not have to prove every aspect of anti-
competitive effect, including a market power analysis. See Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at
460-61 (applying the "quick look" Rule of Reason to a group of dentists' refusal to submit
patient's X-rays to insurance companies); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-03,
109 (1984) (applying the "quick look" Rule of Reason to the NCAA's restrictions on the
number of football games that members could televise and its agreement on the minimum
price member schools would receive for broadcasting rights). Rather, it is sufficient to note
that the Court has deemed the "quick look" version of the Rule of Reason appropriate
when the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained." Cal. Dental
ASS . /1 v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 777 (1999). As such, because it is uncertain whether the "quick
look" version would be applied to actions of drug manufacturers, this Note will analyze the
topic assuming the case falls under the full Rule of Reason. See infra notes 215-328 and
accompanying text.
72
 See Nat'l Soc'y of ProflEng'ts, 435 U.S. at 691.
73 See Coat? 7:V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 58-59; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S.
163, 179 (1931).
74 See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611-13 (1953);
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 252 F.3d 34, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
75 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
76 See infra notes 81-206, 215-328, and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 215-328 and accompanying text.
20051	 A Geographic Marled for Prescription Drug Reimportation	 1039
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION
A. General Theory of U.S. Antitrust Laws
The underlying philosophy of U.S. antitrust laws is to protect free
and fair market competition. 78 Thus, when anticompetitive practices
by private businesses hinder open competition to a substantial degree,
antitrust laws allow courts to step in to regulate practices to protect
competition. 79
As stated above, before a court can apply the Rule of Reason
analysis and evaluate a practice's potentially anticompetitive effects, a
plaintiff first must define a legally sufficient markets° Market
definition has both a product and geographic aspects' Thus, the rele-
vant product market consists of all products that are "reasonably in-
terchangeable" with—that is, are economic substitutes for—the prod-
uct at issue. 82 The geographic market consists of the geographic area
within which competition occurs. 85
Market definition is a critical first step in an analysis of an anti-
trust claim because courts determine if the defendant has market
power according to the defendant's role in the defined market. 84 If an
antitrust plaintiff fails to identify a relevant market, then the defen-
dants are entitled to a dismissal as a matter of law.85 The U.S. Supreme
78 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945) (drawing on legislative intent
to preserve competition and limit the aggregation of capital in select hands because such
behavior hinders free markets).
79 See Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2005) (prohibiting agree-
ments that unreasonably restrain trade); id. § 2 (prohibiting monopolization or attempt to
monopolize); Clayton Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000) (prohibiting price discrimination); id.
§ 3 (prohibiting tying and exclusive dealing agreements that lessen competition); id. § 7
(prohibiting mergers and acquisitions that tend to create monopolies); Federal Trade
Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000) (prohibiting unfair methods of competition).
80 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
81 Batlike v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3(1 340, 344-45 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Spec-
trum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993)). Although this Note deals solely
with geographic market analysis, the complementary product market definition is recog-
nized as being crucial to the Rule of Reason analysis. Id.
82 Id.
89 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
84
 Sec Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1; Conel T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59
(1977) (holding franchise agreement between a manufacturer of television sets and a re-
tailer, which barred the retailer from selling franchised products from locations other than
those specified in the agreement, was an unreasonable restraint of trade under section 1 of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act as analyzed under the Rule of Reason).
85 Sec Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net , 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858-59 (ED. Va. 1999);
see also ABA SECTION or ANTITRUST LAW, 5-npro note 14, at 544-45 (citing TV Commc'zis
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Court has defined market power as "the ability to raise prices above
those that would he charged in a competitive market."86 Without
market power, defendants cannot be liable for anticompetitive behav-
ior, on the rationale that any anticompetitive conduct will not nega-
tively affect the competitive marketplace. 87 In assessing market power,
most courts refer to the defendant's market share (within the defined
geographic and product markets) as a proxy for market power.88
 The
relevant geographic market area translates into the denominator out
of which the particular firm's market share is calculated. 89 The larger
the market share held by a firm, the more market power it is said to
hold.9°
Network v. Turner Network Television, 964 F.2d 1022, 1028 (10th Cir. 1992), where the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant's motion to dismiss because the plaintiff "did not
allege a relevant product market which TNT was capable of monopolizing, attempting to,
or conspiring to monopolize").
86 NCAA v. Ed. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984); see a/so Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 2711.46 (1984).
87 See, e.g., Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th
Cir. 1984) ("[P]laintiff [must] first prove that the defendant has sufficient market power to
restrain competition substantially.... If not, the inquiry is at an end; the practice is law-
ful.") (citations omitted); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merch., 686 F.2d 1190, 1202 (6th
Cir. 1982) ("Without market power, a firm cannot have an adverse effect on competi-
lion.").
aa Flegel v. Christian Hosp., Ne.-Nw., 4 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 1993) ("To establish ...
market power, [it must be] show[n] that the defendants have a dominant market share
in a well-defined relevant market." (internal quotation and citation omitted)). For exam-
ple, if a defendant has a low market share (typically below thirty percent), courts are pre-
cluded from concluding that the defendant maintains market power. See, e.g., Capital Im-
aging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 547 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that a market share of only 1.15% was so "de mm imis" as to lack proof of market power);
Hassam v. Indep. Practice Assocs., P.C., 698 F. Supp. 679, 694-95 (E.D. Mich. 1988)
(finding the market power held by a firm was insufficient, where the firm had a market
share of only twenty percent in a market with low barriers to entry and no evidence of the
defendant's ability to impose above-market prices). On the other hand, if a defendant has
a high market share, it is an indication that the defendant may command market power.
See, e.g., Graphics Prod. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570-71 (11th Cir.
1983) (holding that the defendants' average seventy-percent market share was sufficient to
prove market power in a non-price, vertical restraint on trade); Barrett v. Fields, 924 F.
Supp. 1063, 1075 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding the defendants' fifty-percent market share was
sufficient to prove market power in case regarding an attempted conspiracy to monopo-
lize).
le See Charles Carson Eblen, Defining the Geographic Market in Modern Commerce: The Effect
of Globalization and E-Commerce on Tampa Electric and Its Progeny, 56 liAvi.oR L. REV. 49, 54-55
(2004).
9° See id. Market power is the ability of a firm to obtain higher profits by reducing out-
put and selling at a higher price. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, 501. A firm's
high market power corresponds to its competitors' inability to constrain the firm's pricing
above market equilibrium, skewing the market away from perfect competition. Id.
2005]	 A Geographic Market for Prescription Drug Reimportation 	 1041
Geographic market definition is also a key strategic decision for
the parties. 9 i Typically, a large geographic area decreases the prob-
ability of finding an anticompetitive practice by the targeted firm be-
cause it will have little market power to affect the overall market. 92
Alternatively, a smaller geographic market increases the firm's market
power, which raises the potential that the reviewing court will find
that the market can be manipulated for anticompetitive purposes.°
For this reason, parties often attempt to manipulate the boundaries of
the geographic market as a means of dictating the direction of the
rest of the controversy." Thus, it is crucial that the court define the
relevant geographic market as accurately as possible; failure to do so
could result in a misinterpretation of the antitrust claim 95
B. Courts' Various Approaches to Geographic Market Definition
In 1961, in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., the U.S. Su-
preme Court articulated the standard for determining the relevant
geographic market area as "the market area in which the seller oper-
ates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies." 96
Using this standard to identify a geographic region is difficult because
it requires both capturing the relevant forces of supply and demand
91 See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. at 549 (defendant urged the court to adopt a na-
tional geographic market to gain clearance for the proposed merger, whereas the govern-
ment urged a localized geographic market, limited to the state of Wisconsin, in an attempt
to block the merger); United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F,3d 95, 103, 105 (2d Cir.
1995) (defendant urged the court to adopt a global geographic market, so as to dilute its
market power, whereas the government urged the court to adopt a national geographic
market so as to increase the defendant's market power). The geographic market defines
the group of competitors that consumers may turn to as substitutes if a supplier were to
raise prices. Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 327. Thus, the geographic market represents the com-
petitors that operate as a pricing constraint on the firm in question, Id.
Eblen, SUM note 89, at 54-55,
" Id.
14 Id.
96 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 14, at 532-43. In their attempts to
define the geographic market as accurately as possible, courts tend to focus on six major
factors. Id, at 533-39, First, actual sales patterns are used to determine whether two areas
are within the same market. Id. at 533-34. Second, evidence of parallel price movements
may suggest two areas are part of the same market. Id. at 536. Third, transportation costs,
in relation to the price of the product, are an important consideration in determining
whether two areas are part of the same market. Id, at 536-37. Fourth, governmental barri-
ers to trade, such as licenses, quotas, and tariffs, can limit competition between areas, sig-
nifying two separate geographic markets. Id. at 537-38. Fifth, industry and firm practices
also help courts define the geographic market. Id. at 538. Finally, the nature and scope of
the anticompetitive effect at issue can also determine the likely market. Id. at 538-39.
"365 U.S. at 327.
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and, at the same time, effectively limiting the market so that the ac-
tual market power of each firm is measured. 97 Therefore, a court ap-
plying this standard most undertake a detailed examination of the
particular supply and demand forces at play in each case.98 Although
each case must be decided according to its unique factual circum-
stances, the Court has been inconsistent in identifying and weighing
the economic factors to be considered within the Tampa Electric
framework . 99
Such analytic inconsistency has led the Supreme Court in oppos-
ing directions at times.'" For example, in Tampa Electric itself, even
though the Court articulated a standard that accounts for both sides
of the market, the Court's ensuing analysis focused solely on the sup-
plier's side.' 91 Tampa. Electric involved a utility company, Tampa Elec-
tric, which sued the Nashville Coal Company for failure to perform its
portion of a requirements contract.'" Among other provisions, the
contract required Nashville Coal to supply Tampa Electric's entire
demand for coal for two utility stations for twenty years.'" Near the
expected performance date of the contract, Nashville Coal informed
Tampa Electric that it would not deliver the coal because it believed
the contract violated antitrust laws.'" The Supreme Court diverged
from the district court's finding that the geographic market consisted
97 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,338-39 (1962) (defining the geo-
graphic market to include suppliers in adjacent suburban areas of large metropolitan ar-
eas, but to exclude suppliers outside of the immediate reach of the metropolis). In Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court stressed that Congress envisioned a "pragmatic, factual
approach to the definition of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one." Id. at
336. Furthermore, "Whe geographic market selected must, therefore, both correspond to
the commercial realities of the industry and be economically significant. Thus, although
the geographic market in some instances may encompass the entire Nation, under other
circumstances it may be as small as a single metropolitan area." Id. at 336-37 (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
9a See id. at 331 (describing the identified geographic market as including Tampa-area
consumers and national coal producers).
" See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. at 549-52; United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321,359 (1963).
10° Compare United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,575-76 (1966) (identifying a
national market due to the defendants' business operations despite the fact that they pro-
vided localized services), with Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 358-61 (identifying a local four-
county market due to the localized nature of providing banking services to consumers
despite the fact that national banking competitors operated in the same area).
101 365 U.S. at 331-32 (IT) he relevant competitive market ... is of course the area in
which respondents and the other 700 producers effectively compete.").
1 °2 Id. at 324.
103 Id. at 322.
1 °4 Id. at 323.
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of only peninsular Florida.'" Instead, the Court expanded the geo-
graphic market area to include several other states that were home to
additional producers of coal, available to Tampa Electric.'" By focus-
ing on supply and expanding the geographic market on that basis
alone, the Court only implicitly recognized a national demand and
thereby rendered demand analysis seemingly irrelevant to defining a
geographic market. 107
Similarly, in 1963, in United States v Philadelphia National Bank, the
Supreme Court again held that supply forces were critical in identifying
the relevant geographic market.'" In Philadelphia National Bank, the
government sought to enjoin a proposed merger between Philadelphia
National Bank, the second largest bank in the Philadelphia metropolis,
and Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank, the third largest bank, as illegal
under section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.'"
The Court held the proposed merger void under the Clayton Act be-
cause it would have substantially lessened competition. 11 ° In doing so,
the Court concluded that the relevant geographic market was a four-
county area, reasoning that the banks (the suppliers) transacted very
little business with customers outside of that area
By contrast, in 1966, in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., the Su-
preme Court defined the geographic market by focusing on the mar-
ket demand forces instead of supply forces. 112 In that case, the defen-
dant beer company defined the proper geographic market as the
entire United States, whereas the government argued for a smaller
market of only Wisconsin or a three-state region of Wisconsin, Illinois,
and Michigan.'" The Court held that due to the high demand for
Pabst beer among Wisconsin state residents, the proper geographic
market should be limited to Wisconsin.U 4
Given the Court's inconsistency in focusing alternately on demand
or on supply forces when defining the relevant geographic market in a
105 Id. at 331.
106 Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 331-32.
107 See id.
108 374 U.S. at 358-61.
109 See id. at 330; see also Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1,15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2005); Clay-
ton Act § 7,15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
110 Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 365.
ni Id. at 359. The Supreme Court did not define the geographic market as where the
banks do business or where they competed with each other, but rather as where the effect
of the merger would have been "direct and immediate." Id. at 357.
112 Sec 384 U.S. at 550-52.
113 Id. at 550.
114
 Id. at 550-52.
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given case, scholars have taken the lead in attempting to formulate
workable solutions that properly and uniformly capture the economic
supply and demand forces. 115 Three distinct approaches to defining the
relevant geographic market area have emerged: the "shipments" ap-
proach, the "diversion" approach, and the approach articulated in the
U.S. Department. of Justice's 1992 Merger Guidelines. 116
L Shipments Approach
Guided by the principle in Tampa Electric that the geographic
market is comprised of the area in which buyers and sellers operate,
scholars developed the shipments approach to focus on the physical
locations to which and from which suppliers send shipments. 17 Pro-
ponents of this school of thought believe that all economic factors
affecting price also correlate to the quantity shipped. 118
 Thus, they
use shipping figures as an appropriate proxy indicator to estimate the
geographic market. 119
Under this methodology, the shipment data is first classified into
two categories: destination and origin. 126
 From this starting point, the
analysis identifies the areas from where the majority of the product is
shipped and where the majority of goods are shipped to consumers. 121
Proponents suggest that measuring these patterns captures both the
demand and the supply for the product within a geographic area. 122
Once that area is defined, the total consumption of shipment in the
entire geographic area is calculated to arrive at the total market vol-
tune. 123 The total market volume then functions as the denominator
from which to calculate a particular firm's market share. 124
"5 See Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market De-
lineation in Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45, 72-81 (1973); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 938 (1981).
118 U.S. DEFT' OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL. MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 1.21 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES], reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 1 13,104. See generally Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 115 (articulating the shipments
approach); Landes & Posner, supra note 115 (articulating the diversion approach).
117 Tampa Eke., 365 U.S. at 327; Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 115, at 73.
118 Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 115. at 73-76.
" 9 Id.
'20 Id. at 73.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 115, at 73-76.
' 24 Id. at 74.
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Sonic federal appellate courts have utilized this approach to
define the relevant geographic market.' 25 For example, in 1990, in
United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the shipments approach should be used to define
the geographic market.'" In defending a proposed merger between
two of the largest hospitals in Rockford, Illinois, the defendant hospi-
tals defined the geographic market as a ten-county region based on
the areas in which their patients lived.' 27 The Seventh Circuit, how-
ever, defined the relevant geographic market area as the sole county
where the hospitals were located.' 28 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit
cited the district court's finding that the supply of hospital services
provided by the defendant went to approximately eighty-seven per-
cent of the patients in Rockford and Winnebago counties. 129 Likewise,
approximately eighty-three percent of the patient demand in
Rockford and Winnebago counties was directed to these hospitals.'"
In focusing on the physical locations of the supply and demand forces
of the industry, the court thus adopted the shipments approach. 131
More recently, in 1995, in United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals also adopted the shipments ap-
proach to define the relevant geographic market.' 32 In that, case, Ko-
dak brought suit to modify or terminate consent decrees that it had
entered into in 1921 and 1954 to rectify antitrust violations that ex-
isted at that time.'" In holding that a worldwide geographic market
existed for the sale of photographic film, the Second Circuit noted
that foreign manufacturers supplied one-third of U.S. film. 134 Charac-
terizing this amount as a "significant" foreign presence in the sale of
film, the court turned to the rationale of the shipments approach to
125 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Inc., 63 F.3d at 102-05; United States v. Rockford Metn'l
Corp., 898 F.2d 1278,1284-85 (7th Cir. 1990).
126 898 F.2d at 1284-85.
t27 M.
12' Id.
129 Id.
150
151 See Rockford Mem? Corp., 898 F.2d at 1284-85; Elzinga Sc Hogarty, supra note 115, at
74 (defining a market based on where the services were directed to, in addition to from
where the services were supplied).
132 Eastman Kodak Co, 63 F.3d at 103 (citing the Elzinga & llogarty shipments ap-
proach in its geographic market analysis).
155 Id. at 97.
154 Id. at 104.
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hold that shipment patterns of both domestic and foreign manufac-
turers supported a worldwide geographic market.o°
Although the shipments approach is useful to capture historic
and current market behavior, some critics fault this methodology for
failing to consider the future effects on the geographic market if a
firm attempts to gain further market power,'" Because the shipments
approach measures the elasticity of demand solely by the demand of
current consumers, the methodology fails to capture the effect of the
existence of practicable alternatives that would be available to con-
sumers should prices increase. 137 Acknowledging this criticism, courts
have held that practicable alternatives to the potential suppliers
should be included in any attempt to define the geographic market. 138
Thus, although some lower courts have adopted the shipments ap-
proach, others have rejected it, citing this deficiency. 139
For example, in 1994, in Morgenstern u Wilson, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the relevant geographic market should be
defined to include areas beyond those evident from the current market
structure. 140 In that case, Dan Morgenstern, a cardiac surgeon, alleged
actual monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act by the defendants, other cardiologists and cardiac surgeons
who were members of a professional corporation that referred patients
internally."' Morgenstern focused on where patients actually traveled
for such medical treatment and therefore defined the relevant geo-
graphic market as Lincoln, Nebraska, and twenty-six surrounding coun-
ties, excluding Omaha, Nebraska. 142
 The defendants, on the other
hand, defined the geographic market to include, at a minimum,
19.5
	 at 103. The court also uses the diversion approach to reach the same conclusion.
Id.
16 See, e.g., FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 269 (8th Cir. 1995); Morgenstern v.
Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1994); A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881
F.2d 1396, 1403 (7th Cir. 1989); cf. Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co.,
730 F. Supp. 826, 901 (C.D. III. 1990) (market defined narrowly because pipeline's captive
customers could not readily switch suppliers), affd sub nom. Illinois ex rel. Burris v. Pan-
handle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1991).
137 Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 269.
138
 Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 327.
139 See, e.g., Casey's Gen. Stares, Inc., 64 F.3d at 344-45; United States v. Mercy Health
Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 978 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
140 29 F.3d at 1296.
141 Id. at 1294; see Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2005).
142 Morgenstern, 29 F.3d at 1296. Morgenstern's private practice was located in Lincoln,
Nebraska, which is why he centered his geographic market around that area. Id. at 1293,
1296.
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Omaha, Nebraska. 149 The court determined that Omaha was a practi-
cable alternative for patients in Lincoln, even if these consumers were
not currently turning to Omaha. 144 After expanding the market to in-
clude Omaha, the court reasoned that the defendants lacked sufficient
market power to function as a monopoly. 145
Likewise, in 1995, in Federal Trade Commission v. Freeman Hospital,
the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that the geographic market
must include potential suppliers, even if they are not currently utilized
by consumers. 146 The Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") chal-
lenged the proposed merger between two hospitals in Joplin, Missouri,
as a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 147 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's conclusion that the ITC's proposed geo-
graphic market definition, which was limited to a twenty-seven mile ra-
dius around Joplin, was an unreasonably static approach. 148 The court
acknowledged that adopting the FTC's approach would mean the geo-
graphic market was limited to only a snapshot of the current market. 149
Because these potential suppliers exerted pressure on the defendant by
forcing the defendant to maintain competitive prices, these potential
suppliers were, in reality, a decisiVe factor in the market)"
2. Diversion Approach
Because of the failure of the shipments approach to account for
future effects caused by a firm's current practices, some scholars ad-
vocate adopting a diversion approach.ni This approach defines mar-
ket power as "the ability to set price above marginal cost." 192 The un-
derlying economic premise of this approach is that any firm with
significant market share would be able to set prices above perfect
143 Id.
144 Id. The court included Omaha as part of the geographic market by relying on the
ease of patients in Lincoln to reach Omaha for cardiac procedures, vigorous competition
between health care providers in Lincoln and Omaha, patient referrals by health care
professionals in Lincoln to professionals in Omaha for better care, and Morgenstern's own
practice of performing cardiac surgery in Omaha by commuting from Lincoln. Id. at 1297.
145 Id. at 1297.
146 69 F.3d at 269.
147 Id. at 262-63; sec Clayton Act § 7,15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
148 Freeman Hosp., 6917.3d at 269.
149 Id.
190 See Landes & Posner, supra note 115, at 947.
151 See id. at 938.
155 Id. at 939. This concept is formalized in traditional economic theory as the Lerner
Index, which measures the 'proportional deviation of price at the firm's profit-maximizing
output from the firm's marginal cost at that output." Id.
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market competition circumstances because consumers are unable to
turn to cheaper competitors.'" In a perfectly competitive market," on
the other hand, firms could not set prices above market level.'"
The diversion approach illustrates how the elasticity of demand
can affect a firm's supply decisions. 155 A high elasticity of demand in-
dicates greater ease with which consumers are able to switch to a
competitor's products at the slightest increase in price, forcing firms
to maintain price levels on par with those of their coinpetitors. 156 Al-
ternatively, if a firm faced an inelastic demand for its product, it
would act as a rational profit-maximizing entity by raising prices and
reducing the quantity produced.' 57 Such actions would lower the
firm's total costs while increasing profits through higher prices
charged to consumers. 158 Consequently, the smaller the market share
held by a firm, the greater elasticity of demand facing the firm. 159 A
high elasticity of demand may also correlate to a higher elasticity of
supply.m In terms of market power, a high elasticity of supply mani-
fests itself as small increases in price by any particular firm generating
large increases in output production by competing firms, because
consumer demand will switch from the high-priced product to the
competitor's low-priced product.'"
Although most market share analyses measure the elasticities of
supply and demand, the unique aspect of the diversion approach is
that it incorporates the firm's entire sales when calculating its market
power in the local market. 162 The rationale behind this approach is
that if a firm has entered a local market with even a single sale, it has
done so after calculating the associated costs and determining it to be
profitable.'" Thus, if the local market's price should rise, then ac-
cording to the diversion theory', the firm would simply divert its pro-
duction away from its other markets and to the local market.'" Under
this theory, a distant firm's total production can affect the local geo-
153 Id. at 949-50.
154 Id. at 941-42.
155 Landes & Posner, supra note 115, at 941-42.
158 Id. at 942.
157 Id.
158 Id,
158 Id.
16° See Landes & Posner, supra note 115, at 942,945.
161 m.
162 Id. at 962-65.
10 Id. at 962.
' 6' Id. at 963.
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graphic market's elasticity of supply because the distant firm can di-
vert its total production to the local market at the first sign of a
profitable price change. 05 Because the distant seller has overcome
transportation or other distance-related costs to sell even one unit in
the local market, it follows that the distant seller would not incur ad-
ditional prohibitive costs if it chose to sell additional quantities in the
local market. 160 Following this diversion theory, foreign production
often is included in calculating the domestic firm's market share.I 67
In addition to using the shipments approach in the 1995 Eastman
Kodak case, the Second Circuit also drew upon the diversion theory's
principles. 168 In looking at the photographic film sale market, the
court identified five major manufacturers, naming Kodak as the sole
domestic producer. 166 The court reasoned that because the supply of
film is elastic and foreign film manufacturers had already established
a presence in the U.S. market, foreign film manufacturers would re-
spond to any attempt by Kodak to raise prices by diverting their pro-
duction to the U.S. market from other locations, allowing them to ab-
sorb the increase in consumer demand for cheaper film.I 70 With
Kodak's major competition coining from foreign film manufacturers,
the court held that a worldwide market, as opposed to a national
market, best captured the market pressures lacing Kodak. 171 Thus, the
diversion approach defines the relevant. geographic market by taking
into account the elasticity of demand faced by the particular firm in
order to incorporate potential competition faced by the firm. 172
3. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines Approach
In the 1992 Merger Guidelines, the DOJ and the FTC offered yet
another approach to geographic market definition, which centers on
the opportunity for price discrimination. 173 Similar to the diversion
theory, this approach heavily weighs the effect of price changes on a
market, although it does not focus as much on the cross-elasticity of
165 Landes & Posner, supra note 115, at 964.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 968.
165 63 F.3d at 103 (citing Landes & Posner, supra note 115, at 960-66).
169 Id. at 98.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 105.
172 See supra notes 151-71 and accompanying text.
172 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 116, § 1.2, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH),I1 13,104.
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supply."4 The relevant geographic market includes firms with the abil-
ity; actual or potential, to increase prices without losing so many buyers
that the price increase is unprofitable."5 To arrive at this definition of
the market, a court would estimate the effects of a hypothetical in-
crease in price. 175 If enough buyers would turn to a cheaper alternative,
then the location of that alternative supplier is included in the geo-
graphic market, and additional alternatives are analyzed and included
until an area is identified where a slight increase would not affect the
purchasers' choice of supplier)" Although this definition leaves open
the possibility of a worldwide geographic market, the reality of finding
such an expansive market is diminished because the 1992 Merger
Guidelines do not allow for geographic price discrimination. 178 There-
fore, if the company can differentiate prices on a geographic basis,
then the smaller regions in which the company has power to set the
prices will be recognized as separate geographic markets. 175
Courts are increasingly adopting this approach. 1513 For instance,
in 1989, in FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed an injunction preventing the acquisition of one indus-
trial dry corn manufacturer by another.im The defendants argued
that the targeted company was not in the same geographic market
because their plants were located in Kansas and the acquirer's plants
were in Indiana. 152 The defendants argued that each plant supplied a
different demand market by virtue of their locations on different
sides of the Mississippi River) 53 The court, however, viewed the geo-
graphic market as covering the entire nation. 154 In defining the geo-
graphic market as nationwide, the court followed the 1992 Merger
174 See id. § 1.0.
178 See
178 Id. § 1.21.
177 Id.
178 See 1992 MEI1GEN GUIDELINES, supra note 116, § 1.22, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,104.
178 Id.
too See, e.g., Eastman Kodak 504 U.S. at 455, 459-79; FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d
901, 906-07 (7th Cir. 1989); FTC v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 681 F. Stipp. 27, 51 (D.D.C.) (explain-
ing the relevant geographic market did not include foreign producers because although
foreign producers may have met domestic inelastic demands, foreign production would
not have been significant in the short term because foreign producers were not a
significant reservoir of capacity), vacated as moot 850 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
181 Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d at 907-08.
10 Id. at 906-07.
188 Id.
184 Id. at 906 ("The defendants and everyone else in their industry ship industrial dry
corn all over the United States.").
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Guidelines by emphasizing the price-setting power of competitors)"
Because there were only five suppliers in the United States, the court
reasoned that when faced with increased prices from any one manu-
facturer of dry corn, consumers would turn to any alternative, regard-
less of that supplier's location) 86 As further evidence of a national
market, the court noted that minimal shipping costs allowed suppliers
on either side of the Mississippi to meet national demand) 87 The
court thus viewed both companies as operating in the same geo-
graphic market because either could supply the same product to buy-
ers nationwide if the other increased prices) 88 The court held that if
the acquisition were allowed, then an alternate supply source would
be eliminated for buyers. 189
Yet courts have not uniformly accepted the 1992 Merger Guide-
lines' approach to geographic market definition)" For example, in
Eastman Kodak, the Second Circuit. rejected this approach) 91 Attempt-
ing to follow the 1992 Merger Guidelines' approach, the government
in that case had pointed out Kodak's ability to engage in price dis-
crimination within the U.S. market by charging a premium) 92 The
government alleged Kodak's ability to engage in price discrimination
meant that a global market definition would be too broad) 93 The
court rejected this argument, reasoning that although Kodak's do-
mestic wholesale prices were higher than its foreign wholesale prices,
there was no evidence to suggest that Kodak's costs were uniform
throughout the world) 94 The court concluded that without uniform-
ity of costs, price differentials among geographic regions could not
definitively represent multiple markets; additional entry costs experi-
enced in one region but not the next could account for higher prices
from region to region)"
185 Sec id. at 907; 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 116, § 1.21, reprinted in 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,104.
186 ENV'S Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d at 907.
187 Id. at 906.
186 Id. at 906-07.
189 Id. at 907.
190 Sec Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d at 106; 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 116,
§§ 1.0, 1.2, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,104.
191
 Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d at 106; 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 116, § 1.2,
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,104.
192 Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d at 106.
193 Id.
II" Id. at 106-07.
196 See id.
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4. Other Factors Contributing to Geographic Market Definition
In addition to the aforementioned three approaches, which focus
on actual sales patterns, elasticity of supply and demand, and pricing
power, courts have identified several other factors that they reason
contribute to the definition of the geographic market. 196 Among these
additional factors are the nature of the product or service, govern-
mental barriers to trade (such as tariffs, quotas, or differing govern-
mental regulatory practices), transportation costs, parallel price
movements between two areas, and industry standards. 197 Courts often
consider these factors when defining a geographic market, regardless
of the overall approach they use—a practice that can lead to opposite
conclusions regarding the proper geographic definition, even within
the same approach, depending on the weight courts accord to the
various factors.I98
In 1966, in United States v. Grinnell alp., the Supreme Court held
that industry operating standards can be used to arrive at a national
geographic market definition. 199 The majority reasoned that in pro-
viding burglary and fire protection services, the overall business struc-
ture and plan of the defendant corporations was coordinated at a na-
tional level. 200 Pointing to the recorded national schedule of prices,
rates, and terms, the majority concluded that to reflect properly the
national scope in which the defendants conducted business, a na-
tional geographic market must be adopted.201 The dissent, however,
argued that the business structure of the defendants was not as essen-
tial as the nature of the services they provided 202 In protecting clients
196 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST 1..Aw, supra note 14, at 536-39.
197
 Id,; see also United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602,628 (1974)
(noting that entrance into the banking industry depends on governmental authorization);
Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d at 108 (concluding a worldwide market existed because of par-
allel pricing movements between U.S. and foreign markets); Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion
Spark Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384,1394 (5th Cir. 1983) (looking to transportation costs, deliv-
ery limitations, and customer convenience to define the relevant geographic market);
United States v. Hammermill Paper Co„ 429 F. Stipp. 1271,1278 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (stating
that the fact that there was "no separate delivered pricing zone" established a national
market).
198 Compare Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 575-76 (concluding a national market existed
because of the defendants' nationwide planning and contracting systems), with id. at 587-
90 (Forms, J., dissenting) (arguing a local market existed because of the localized nature
of the services provided by defendants).
19° Id, at 575-76.
200 Id.
20 ' Id.
202 Id, at 587-90 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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from fire and burglary, the defendants maintained local central serv-
ice stations that received notification of alarms and in turn notified
local police or fire departments. 203 Because each protected house was
stationary and the fire and burglary protection ultimately had to be
provided at each home's individual location, the dissent reasoned that ,
the proper geographic market should be limited to these discrete lo-
cal areas. 204 Furthermore, buyers contracted directly with the local
providers on the basis of local conditions, and each service center
only covered a radios of twenty-five miles. 2°5 Calling the business as-
pects "incidental" to the services the defendants provided, the dissent
contended that the majority simply had ignored the economic reali-
ties underlying the market at hand. 206
C. The Effect of Internet Sales in Geographic Market Definition
Despite a lack of consensus about which economic theory to
adopt as the reasoning behind the application of Tampa Electric and
the identification of other factors outside of those offered by the
three scholarly analyses, the one commonality regarding geographic
market definition has been adherence to the need to delineate the
physical location of the inarket. 207 This practice may be problematic
when courts are faced with cases involving the Internet and e-
commerce.268 Through the World Wide Web, a company can establish
a truly global market for any product. 209 Unsurprisingly, when courts
have addressed instances of Internet. trade, they admittedly have en-
countered much difficulty in defining the geographic market.2"
Without defined boundaries or a physical place, the Internet allows
millions of people, from throughout the world, to reach each other. 2 "
205 Grinnell col., 384 U.S. at 588.
204 See id. at 589-90 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 588.
2°6 Id. at 589.
207 Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 327; see Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d at 103 (defining a global
geographic market because producers all over the world held significant market pres-
ence); Morgenstern, 29 F.3d at 1296-97 (defining the geographic market as the state of
Nebraska); Rockford Mem? Corp., 898 F.2d at 1284-85 (defining the geographic market as
Winnebago County, Illinois); Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d at 906-07 (defining the geo-
graphic market as the belt of states running from Indiana on the east side of the Missis-
sippi River to Kansas and Nebraska on the west side of the Mississippi River).
208 See, e.g., GreatDcals.Net , 49 F. Supp. 2d at 858 (citing CyberPromotions, Inc. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 456,459 (1996)).
2" Eblen, supra note 89, at 80-81.
210 Sec GrcatDcals.Net, 49 F. Stipp. 2d at 858.
211 See CyberPromotions, Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 459.
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From a commercial market perspective, the Internet allows local sup-
pliers to reach beyond their physical localities, expanding their "geo-
graphic" markets. 212
 The obstacle for courts, however, lies in measur-
ing properly the impact of Internet sales—which can occur
throughout the world—Without diluting the market share of firms by
automatically assuming the firm competes within a global geographic
market. 2u Given that more and more suppliers are turning to the
Internet for the very purpose of reaching a broader market of buyers,
as seen in the case of reimportation of prescription drugs, the courts
soon will have to determine how to incorporate Internet sales into a
geographic market analysis. 219
III. APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES OF GEOGRAPHIC
MARKET DEFINITION TO ANTITRUST LITIGATION INVOLVING
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Drug manufacturers may be subject to antitrust claims, based on
section 1 of the Sherman Act, if sufficient evidence exists of coordina-
tion among them to limit drug supplies to the Canadian market, in an
overall attempt to prevent U.S. consumers from purchasing cheaper
drugs. 215
 Because section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act prohibits
unreasonable vertical or horizontal price agreements, a court analyzing
such a claim would have to find the restraint unreasonable in order to
212 Eblen, supra note 89, at 80-81.
213 See ABA SECTION or ANTrrxesT Lim, supra note 14, at 494 (stating that the starting
point of any antitrust analysis is determining the market share of the firm, which can be
done only after the overall market has beets defined).
214 Eblen, supra note 89, at 80-81.
215 See Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2005); United States v. Trans-
Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,312 (1897) (interpreting section 1 of the Sherman Act to
prohibit horizontal agreements among competitors that affect price or price-related fea-
tures). It is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze whether there is sufficient evidence to
conclude if drug manufacturers have committed an antitrust violation. Rather, this Note
presupposes that there is sufficient evidence for a court to engage in a market analysis.
The applicability and focus of this Note is limited to the sole issue of geographic market
definition. Once the geographic market is defined, a court would continue the market
analysis by defining the product market and then calculating the market share held by the
defendants. See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352,359-60 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that
"[w] hether market power exists in an appropriately defined market is a fact-bound ques-
tion" and continuing to define geographic and product markets to determine the defen-
dants had a fifty-percent market share). The market analysis then would allow the court to
gauge the anticompetitive effect of the disputed action. Id. (agreeing with the district
court's findings that the defendant's boycott had anticompetitive effects).
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impose legal liability under the Rule of Reason. 21° Under this analysis,
the plaintiffs first must prove that such restrictions on supply have an-
ticompetitive effects. 2t 7 Then, the defendants would have the oppor-
tunity to prove that the restraint in question offers offsetting procom-
petitive effects. 21 ° Should the defendants be successful in presenting
such evidence, the burden would shift back to the plaintiffs to dem-
onstrate that the restraint was not reasonably necessary to achieve the
purported benefits. 21 °
In this Rule of Reason analysis, one of the first issues the plaintiff
would face would be defining the relevant market, which includes the
relevant geographic market. 22° This Note argues that for the drug
manufacturers to have violated the Sherman Act in their attempt to
prevent drug reimportation, Canada must be included as part of the
relevant geographic market definition analyzed in an antitrust
elaim. 221 Excluding Canada from the geographic market would sepa-
rate the drug companies' practices into two distinct markets, preclud-
ing an antitrust violation because the disputed action would occur in
the Canadian market. and would therefore have no anticompetitive
effect on the U.S. market and would remain unreachable by U.S.
oversight—even though the drug manufacturers' actions affect U.S.
consumers.222 In other words, the level of anticompetitive effects due
to the targeted conduct can only be measured if the threshold issue of
geographic market is defined to include Canada. 223
This Part applies the various theoretical approaches of geo-
graphic market definition to the drug manufacturing industry, in par-
ticular, to the practice of drug reimportation.224 After illustrating how
the judicial test, articulated in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
216 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972) (referring to Congress's
intent that practices that "in some insignificant degree" restrain competition would not be
held to violate antitrust laws).
217 See Nat'l Soc'y of Prort Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
216 See Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc„ 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 179 (1931).
219 See Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1; Coral TV, Inc., 433 U.S. at 49 (holding that the ver-
tical restraint between a manufacturer and retailer of television sets is illegal, as analyzed
under the Rule of Reason based on section 1 of Sherman Act); see also Nat'l Socy of Profl
Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692-96 (applying first the Rule of Reason to find anticompetitive effects
and then continuing to analyze the defendant's purported justifications).
220 Sec Tarnpa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
221 see
222 See id. (inferring that if conduct occurs in a separate market, then it would be out-
side the area to which the purchaser can practicably turn" for alternatives).
223 See supra notes 73, 81-90 and accompanying text.
224 Sec infra notes 228-75 and accompanying text.
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would support inclusion of Canada as part of the geographic market,
this Part details how the other theoretical approaches—the shipments
approach, the diversion approach, and the 1992 Merger Guidelines
approach—also support this conclusion. 225
 Filially, this Part addresses
some of the additional factors that must be accounted for when
defining the relevant geographic market for the unique situation of
drug reimportation.22° This Part argues that these additional factors
are essential to any court's geographic market analysis and that any
analysis must account for these unique factors. 227
A. Pharmaceutical Drug Reimportation Under the Tampa Electric Standard
for Geographic Market Definition
In 1961, in Tampa Electric, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
relevant geographic market is the area to which consumers can prac-
ticably turn for alternatives if suppliers increased prices. 228 Applying
the Tampa Electric standard to an antitrust claim against drug manu-
facturers reveals that Canada should be included as part of the geo-
graphic market. 229
 Current industry practices and evidence of arbi-
trage are strong indicators that any geographic market should
recognize Canada for purposes of applying U.S. antitrust laws to this
practice.288
 The first, prong of the Tampa Electric test—the area in
which the seller operates—supports the inclusion of Canada based on
the conduct of the major drug companies.m The most compelling
evidence for this argument is the fact that companies such as Merck,
GlaxoSmithKline, Roche, and Pfizer maintain manufacturing plants
throughout the world to support their global distribution systems.282
225 See infra notes 239-75 and accompanying text.
226
 Sec infra notes 276-328 and accompanying text.
227 See infra notes 276-328 and accompanying text.
228 See 365 U.S. at 327.
229
 See id.
230 See Llzinga & Hogarty, supra note 115, at 73; Landes & Posner, supra note 115, at
942, 964. Compare United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 574, 575 (1966) (recognizing
that the security industry planned and maintained its production process and manage-
ment on a national level), with Careers with Pfizer Global Manufacturing (PGM), supra
note 34 (showing that Pfizer maintains a global perspective when manufacturing its prod-
ucts, including those sold in the United Slates), and Pierce, supra note 34 (recognizing that
the pharmaceutical industry maintains a national perspective in its business planning and
production process).
231 Sec 365 U.S. at 327.
232 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 34 (quoting GlaxoSmithl(line representatives as stating
they have a "global* manufacturing and packaging outfit); Careers with Pfizer Global
Manufacturing (PGM), supra note 34 (describing its global manufacturing plants).
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In fact, by its very definition, reimportation is limited to only those
drugs that are first manufactured in the United States, shipped to the
Canadian market in accord with the manufacturer's plans, and then
brought. back into the United States by sales from Canadian pharma-
cies. 233 Thus, Canada is clearly a primary area in which drug manufac-
turers conduct business. 234
The second prong of the Tampa Electric test—the area in which
the U.S. consumer (as the purchaser) can practicably turn for supply
alternatives—narrows the geographic market from a potentially
global market to include only Canada and the United States. 233 An
annual $695 million commercial trade, with consumer pressure for
even greater growth, clearly indicates that U.S. consumers are turning
to Canadian suppliers for their prescription drugs. 238 Regarding the
ease of obtaining prescription drugs from Canada, the presence of
online pharmacies has expanded the portion of consumers who can
practicably turn to Canadian suppliers, a key qualification in the Tampa
Electric test.237 A supply option that previously was limited to only those
living near the Canadian border or with enough expendable re-
sources to travel to Canada has now become a reality for millions of
Americans with access to a computer and a mailing service. 238
B. Academic Approaches to Geographic Market Definition
and Reimportation of Prescription Drugs
Beyond the general Tampa Electric test, this section applies the
three theoretical approaches of geographic market definition to the
issue of the reimportation of prescription drugs. 238 Like a court em-
ploying the standard Tampa Electric approach, Courts using either the
shipments and diversion approaches also would conclude that Canada
should be included as part of any proper geographic market analysis. 240
The geographic market definition under the 1992 Merger Guidelines,
233 	TASK FORCE ON DRUG hip., supra.note 4, at 3.
284 See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
235 See Tantpa Den, 365 U.S. at 327; EMS "Fmk FORCE ON DRUG IMP., supra note 4, at
11-12.
235 FINS TASK FORGE ON DRUG IM p ., Supra note 4, at 11-12.
237 See Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 327 (defining the second prong of the test as the mar-
ket area ... to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies*); Eblen, supra note
89, at 80-81 (arguing that the Internet has allowed for greater contact between consumers
and sellers regardless of the distance of separation).
239 See Eblen, supra now 89, at 80-81.
239 See infra notes 243-75 and accompanying text.
219 Sec infra notes 243-64 and accompanying text.
1058	 Boston College Law Review
	 IVoI. 46:1027
however, is less definitive. 241 After this section analyzes drug reimporta-
tion under the three scholarly approaches, Part I[I.0 focuses more
closely on the unique aspects of reimportation, such as the heavy pres-
ence of Internet sales and the existence of governmental barriers, and
ultimately concludes that the diversion approach is best suited for
defining the geographic market in which drug manufacturers com-
pete. 242
I. Prescription Drug Reimportalion Under the Shipments Approach
The shipments approach emphasizes the quantity shipped by the
suppliers to various destinations as a proxy indicator of the market
share held by the supplier in each destination market. 243 For purposes
of the shipments approach, the pharmaceutical industry's interna-
tional business operation highlights the fact that any geographic mar-
ket analysis related to this industry cannot be restricted by traditional
geographic demarcations because that is simply not how the industry
operates. 244 In fact, one of the industry's primary arguments against
legalizing reimportation has been that it would reduce drug manufac-
turers' U.S. profits and thereby limit the expenditures invested into
the research and development of new pharmaceutical drugs. 245 Indus-
try representatives Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America released a report in 2003 that cited the findings of several
economic studies, which indicated that lower prices in the United
States due to reimportation from Canada would lead to a 36.1% to
47.5% reduction in overall research and development intensity. 240
Thus, there is a close tie and almost an interdependence between the
U.S. and Canadian prescription drug supplies. 247
Not only does this aspect of the pharmaceutical industry's research
and development funding support a broad geographic definition, but
the industry's widely dispersed manufacturing system also supports a
global geographic market definition.248
 Drugs currently supplied in the
2" See infra notes 265-75 and accompanying text.
242 See infra notes 276-328 and accompanying text.
245 See Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 115, at 73-76.
244 See NHS TASK FORCE ON DRUG 1M1'., supra note 4, at 3 (describing how reimported
drugs are actually manufactured in the United States and then shipped to Canada by the
pharmaceutical companies).
245 See id.
246 See PHARSI. RESEARCH MFRS. or AM., supra note 36, at 15.
247 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
248 See HEIS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMP., supra note 4, at 37 (discussing the current
means through which foreign medicines enter the United States).
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United States frequently are manufactured in plants located in foreign
countries and shipped to the United States for sale. 249 In the specific
instance of reimportation, the drugs at issue are manufactured in U.S.
plants and then shipped to Canada for retail sales. 250 Therefore, the
industry's own production process considers Canada and the United
States as part of the same geographic market. 251
The coordination and business structure of the pharmaceutical
industry thus mirrors that of the burglary and fire protection indus-
try; which was analyzed by the U.S. Supreme Court in an antitrust
claim in 1966.252 in United States v. Grinnell co7p.,253 the Court defined
a national market based on the burglary and fire protection industry's
national schedule of prices, rates, and terms. 254 Similarly, under the
shipments approach here, courts should define the geographic mar-
ket to include Canada based on the pharmaceutical industry's inter-
national operation of manufacturing plants, shipping patterns, and
allocation of research and development funds. 255
2. Prescription Drug Reimportation Under the Diversion Approach
To apply the diversion approach, one must determine the elasticity
of supply and demand in the pharmaceutical industry. 25° Although cal-
culation of each specific numeric elasticity is beyond the scope of this
Note, the evidence of arbitrage in the pharmaceutical industry lends
credence to the proposition that domestic demand is fairly elastic. 257
Internet sales from Canadian pharmacies have created a truly global
market, in which consumers are able to divert their consumption from
domestic markets to cheaper alternatives from foreign markets. 258 At
the same time, retailers in the pharmaceutical industry also exhibit a
249 Id.
25'1 See id. at 3.
251 See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
252 Compare Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 575 (recognizing that the security industry
planned and maintained its production process and management on a national level), with
Careers with Pfizer Global Manufacturing (PPM), supra note 34 (showing that Pfizer coor-
dinates among its global facilities to manufacture its products), and Pierce, supra note 34
(recognizing that the pharmaceutical industry maintains a national perspective in its busi-
ness planning and production process).
253 Sec Grinnell Coip., 384 U.S. at 575-76.
254 Id. at 575.
255 See id.
256 See Landes & Posner, supra note 115. at 944-45.
257 See id. at 942.
258 See Eblen, supra note 89, at 80-81.
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relatively high elasticity of supply. 259 This phenomenon is manifested by
the fact that many Canadian pharmacies are increasing their output to
satisfy the demands of U.S. consumers as U.S. consumers switch from
the higher-priced domestic product to the cheaper Canadian prod-
uct.260
 Thus, the Canadian pharmacies' elastic supply of prescription
drugs can absorb the excess U.S. consumer demand created as a result
of the higher prices of domestic prescription drugs. 261
Consequently, the prescription drug market exhibits characteris-
tics similar to those of the photographic film market in United States v.
Eastman Kodak Co. in 1995.262 In that case, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals utilized the diversion approach to define a global geographic
market for the photographic film industry. 263 Just as in the pharma-
ceutical industry with relation to Canadian suppliers, the photo-
graphic film industry at the time of the court's decision consisted of
international competitors who could easily absorb excess consumer
demand as a result of a price increase by Kodak, the defendant
firm.264
3. Drug Reimportation Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines
- The final major theory of geographic market definition, the 1992
Merger Guidelines, might prove to be the least useful in reference to
the pharmaceutical industry, though it still lends some support to in-
cluding Canada as part of the U.S. market. 265 On the one hand, the
1992 Merger Guidelines suggest the inclusion of Canada within the
geographic market because empirical evidence seems to show that as
domestic prices increase, a greater number of U.S. consumers turn to
259 See Landes & Posner, supra note 115, at 945.
266 See id. at 947.
261 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that the ability of foreign competitors to absorb the excess demand led to their inclusion
as part of the relevant geographic market definition.) By including Kodak's competitors,
the court recognized a global geographic market because Kodak's major competitors were
located throughout the world, coining from japan, Europe, and the United States. Id.
262 Id. (applying the Tampa Electric standard to define a worldwide market because Ko-
dak sold on a worldwide basis, its competitors were foreign companies, and its purchasers
turned to foreign competitors' film products as alternatives to Kodak's products).
265 Id. at 104.
261 Id.
265 See 1992 MERGER Gunn:firms, supra noie 116, § 1.22, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 1 13,104 (incorporating the ability of the firm to set prices higher than perfect
competition levels, while at the same time refusing to recognize price discrimination
within the geographic market).
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cheaper alternatives, including reimportation from Canada. 266 Iii
1988, in Federal Trade Commission. v. Elders Grain, Inc., the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals concluded that a national geographic market
existed in the industrial dry corn industry based on evidence that
consumers were willing to purchase from any supplier, regardless of
their location in the United States. 267 Similarly, in the pharmaceutical
industry, a court could draw on the evidence that U.S. consumers are
uniformly willing to purchase their prescription drugs from Canadian
suppliers, regardless of their proximity, or lack thereof, to Canada. 268
Although the above analysis would support the inclusion of Can-
ada within the geographic market, the 1992 Merger Guidelines sug-
gests the exclusion of Canada from any geographic market because
the Guidelines do not recognize geographic price discrimination. 269
The Second Circuit. Court of Appeals rejected the government's ar-
gument for geographic market definition in Eastman. Kodak. 2" In do-
ing so, the government relied on the 1992 Merger Guidelines to sug-
gest that because of the different prices charged by Kodak in the
United States and in foreign markets, the geographic market should
be limited to the United States. 271 Without evidence that Kodak in-
curred equal costs in the domestic and foreign markets, the court re-
fused to identify the U.S. market as a separate geographic market for
purposes of the antitrust. analysis. 272 Following the court's analysis in
Eastman. Kodak, one could argue that the price differentials between
the Canadian and U.S. markets is simply the result of differences in
costs experienced by the drug manufacturing industry. 279 For exam-
ple, the approval process for new drugs, differences in governmental
regulations, and per capita income differentials between the U.S. and
288 See id.
262 FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906-07 (7th Cir. 1989).
268 See HHS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMP., supra note 4, at 11, fig.1.1. A report from the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services found 355 points of entry into the United
States for reimported drugs, including mail, courier, and port services. Id. Each state, ex-
cept for South Dakota, had at least one point of entry through which prescription drugs
could reach U.S. citizens from Canada. Id.
289 Sec 1992 MERGER GutnEttNEs, supra note 116, § 1.22, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 1 13,104 (arguing that the presence of geographic price discrimination supports
the identification of multiple geographic markets, as opposed to a single all-inclusive geo-
graphic market).
228 See 63 F.3d at 103, 105.
271 See id. at 106; 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 116, § 1.22, reprinted in 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) X 13,104.
272 See Eastman Kodak, 63 F.3d at 106.
276 See id. at 103-06.
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Canadian markets all potentially contribute to the industry's differen-
tial pricing. 274 Because the application of the 1992 Merger Guidelines
generates these contradictory outcomes, this approach seems to offer
the least insight of the scholarly approaches into defining the relevant
geographic market. 275
C. Unique Factors of Prescription Drug Reimportation
and Its Geographic Market Definition
Besides offering another opportunity for courts to assess the mer-
its of the various approaches to geographic market definition, the fac-
tual circumstances of the reimportation issue provide a unique oppor-
tunity for the courts to address the difficult and novel issues related to
geographic market definition: those arising from the sale of prescrip-
don drugs on the Internet and the unpredictable status of govern-
mental barriers to reimportation
1. Effect of Internet Sales
Unlike many practices of other industries that are challenged as
being potentially anticompetitive, the practice of drug reimportation is
fueled by the Internet—meaning the Internet plays a larger role in
geographic market definition here than it would for most other indus-
tries.277 The entire practice of reimportation is a practicable alternative
to most U.S. consumers only because the Internet allows distant con-
sumers (those located within the United States) easy access to distant
suppliers (those located within Canada). 278
 In other words, the pres-
ence of the Internet has effectively integrated two otherwise separate
and distinct geographic markets for prescription drugs—that of the
United States and that of Canada—into a single geographic market. 279
2. Effect of Governmental Barriers
In addition to the effect of Internet sales, governmental barriers to
trade also must be accounted for in any legal analysis regarding the
274 See BAKER, supra note 61, at 2-3.
275
 See id.
276 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858-59 (E.D. Va.,
1999); CyberPromotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 456, 459 (E.D. Pa., 1996).
277 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
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pharmaceutical industry. 28° Currently, Canada allows its pharmacies to
fill patient prescriptions without requiring the patient first to have vis-
ited a Canadian doctor. 28 I It is because of this nonregttlation that Ca-
nadian Internet pharmacies are able to operate. 282 There may be rea-
son to believe, however, that the Canadian government will soon erect
barriers to the operation of Internet pharmacies in an effort. to limit
reimportation. 288 Canadian officials have recently begun discussing re-
quiring Canadian physicians to see U.S. patients in person before pre-
scribing their medication. 284 Such a change would make it practically
impossible for many Americans to receive medications from Canada via
the Internet. 285 Currently lacking such regulations, however, the Cana-
dian government poses no governmental barriers to reimportation. 288
The greater governmental challenge to reimportation comes
from the U.S. government, which technically maintains that commer-
cial reimportation is illegal. 287 There are signs, however, that this gov-
ernmental barrier may not be as absolute as it initially appeared. 288
The 2003 Medicare Act has in name legalized reimportation; all that
remains to effectuate this change is the approval of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. 289 In addition, the FDA, the federal
agency in charge of enforcing the U.S. laws against reimportation, has
not been enforcing these laws. 29° Furthermore, increasing public
pressure for more affordable prescription drugs has motivated many
public representatives to advocate change. 291 In fact, many state and
283 Sec infra notes 281-328 and accompanying text.
291 See Finkelstein, supra note 62, at 6.
282 See id. (describing how Canadian doctors currently copy and then issue prescrip-
tions written by U.S. doctors without requiring an in-person consultation).
283 See id. at 5,
2m Id.
299 See Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 327 (including practicable consumer alternatives as part
of the calculus for determining the relevant geographic market).
293 Sec Finkelstein, supra note 62, at 5.
292 See HUS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMP., supra note 4, at 4-5.
283 See id. at 1-5.
289 Id.
299 Id. at 20.
291 See Pharmaceutical Reimportation from Canada, supra note 65 (reporting to the House
Government Reform Subcommittee on Wellness and Human Rights that prescription drug
costs should be lowered and that U.S. Rep, Bernie Sanders had introduced legislation that
would prohibit pharmaceutical companies from retaliating against Canadian pharmacies
selling to Americans); McLaughlin & Davidson, supra note 59 (urging union members to
pressure their senators to take action on drug reimportation legislation); Reimportation
Update, supra note 59 (quoting Sen. Grassley as stating, "'American consumers are demand-
ing lower prices on prescription drugs . • ..'").
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local governments have already implemented programs to facilitate
the purchase of drugs from Internet sources. 292
 Filially, and perhaps
most indicative of the need to address the situation, a variety of legal
challenges raised under state antitrust laws are forcing this issue be-
fore the courts for resolution. 293
Under current understanding, governmental barriers, on either
the Canadian or the U.S. side, would suggest the exclusion of Cana-
dian sales from any geographic market analysis for purposes of U.S.
antitrust laws. 294 The traditional understanding rests upon the as-
sumption that such barriers usually indicate separate geographic
markets because it is assumed that suppliers would cater their busi-
ness to the unique regulatory demands of each market. 298 The prac-
tice of reimportation of pharmaceutical drugs, however, explicitly
recognizes that the suppliers' products are the same, regardless of
whether the supplier is located in the United States or in Canada. 296
In other words, to reimport drugs to the United States, the drugs are
first produced in the United States (along with drugs that are sold in
the United States), exported to Canada, and then sold by Canadian
pharmacies back to U.S. consumers. 297 Thus, the traditional assump-
tion that suppliers are catering to different markets due to govern-
mental regulations is inapplicable in the context of drug reimporta-
tion.298 Rather, in the case of drug reimportation, drug manufacturers
produce the prescription drugs that are sold to both the U.S. and Ca-
nadian markets in the same factories located in the United States.299
This practice suggests that governmental regulations are not barriers
to the industry practice that views both Canada and the United States
as a single North American market.36°
292 See Pharmaceutical &importation from Canada, supra note 65; McLaughlin & David-
son, supra note 59; Reimportation Update, supra note 59.
293 See In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 307 F. Supp. 2d 196, 213-15
(D. Mass. 2004).
294 See id.
299
 See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602. 628 (1974) (stating
that entrance into the banking industry depends on governmental authorization); ABA
SEC /ON OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 14, at 537-38.
298 See HI-IS TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMP., supra note 4, at 3.
2" See id.
298 Cf. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 628 (citing the fact that entrance into the
banking industry depends on governmental authorization as a factor in delineating the
relevant geographic market area).
299 See HI-16 TASK FORCE ON DRUG IMP., supra note 4, at 3.
300 See supra notes 41-51, 280-99 and accompanying text.
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An additional governmental barrier that. is likewise not to be
viewed as an absolute divide is related to the wholesale pharmaceuti-
cal pricing schemes between the United States and Canada."' The
Canadian government, through the PMPRB, imposes a cap on the
wholesale prices pharmaceutical drug manufacturers can charge
By contrast, the U.S. government has established only a self-reporting
system that allows drug manufacturers to set wholesale prices. 503 Al-
though the Canadian system might seem to be the more anticompeti-
tive model because it injects the heavy hand of government into the
free market, the U.S. model, upon closer inspection, does not operate
on a free market basis either." 4
For example, in 2003, in Itt re Pharmaceutical Industry Average
Wholesale Price Litigation, a Federal District Court in Massachusetts was
presented with evidence revealing monopolistic pricing tendencies in
the United States by the major pharmaceutical companies. 505 The
plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the exorbitant "spread" between the
actual wholesale price and the charged wholesale price violated fed-
eral antitrust laws. 50° For multiple prescription drugs, the DOJ calcu-
lated that the AWP (the drug manufacturer's reported "wholesale"
price) exceeded the actual wholesale price by hundreds to thousands
of percents. 507 Such evidence suggests that the pharmaceutical manu-
facturers are actually operating as a monopolistic cartel, setting prices
higher than would be expected in a purely competitive free market.308
Regardless of whether the U.S. pricing mechanism is an antitrust
violation, the pricing scheme does support the idea that the pharma-
ceutical industry views the Canadian and U.S. markets as a single
market, 309 As already discussed, the majority of global research and
development undertaken by pharmaceutical companies is funded by
"1 See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
302 Sec supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
"3 See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
3434 For examples of the U.S. government's regulation of free markets in the United
States, see, e.g., Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.A. § I (West 2005); Sherman Anti-
Trust Act § 2; Clayton Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 23 (2000); Clayton Act § 14; Clayton Act
§ 18; Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
3°9
	 II 699-703, fu re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 263 F.
Supp. 2d 172 (D. Mass. 2003).
308 See id. 11 187, 208, 280, 311, 466, 501, 534.
307 Sec id.
"8 See id.
309 See Careers with Pfizer Global ManufaCturing (PGM), supra note 34 (describing its
global manufacturing plants).
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revenues generated in the United States." 0 Thus, the regulatory na-
ture of the Canadian market does not operate as a wall between Can-
ada and the United States; rather, it highlights the fact that the phar-
maceutical companies augment their Canadian sales with profits
earned by having a high price spread in the U.S. markets 511
Although the current regulatory scheme does not prohibit sales
between Canada and the United States, potential new legislation
could dramatically reduce the commerce between the two countries
in the future.512
3. The Best Methodology: The Diversion Approach
Given the deeply political nature of this issue, the diversion ap-
proach is the best analytical framework to address the antitrust issues
raised by drug manufacturers' attempts to end the practice of rein].
portation of prescription drugs." 3 The shipments approach's focus on
the current status of the market means it could misinterpret the ac-
tual market if governmental regulations eventually limit transactions
between Canadian pharmacies and U.S. drug manufacturers." 4 Un-
like the shipments approach, which includes only current shipment
figures in its analysis of the geographic market, the diversion ap-
proach is able to measure both the current and future status of any
market. 315 Thus, even if legislation eventually limits the trade between
Canadian pharmacies and U.S. drug manufacturers, the diversion ap-
proach still will include Canada as part of a single market based on
the idea that the U.S. drug companies have entered the Canadian
wholesale market through their willingness to continue sales to Cana-
dian wholesales who do not sell to U.S. customers." 6 The shipments
approach, in contrast, would simply conclude that two markets exist
because significant units of product no longer would be shipped to
316 See id.
311 See supra notes 31-33,57, and accompanying text.
3/2 See Finkelstein, sepia note 62, at 5.
313 See supra notes 151-72 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 117-50 and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 151,162-67, and accompanying text.
316 See supra notes 151,162-67, and accompanying text (explaining that under the di-
version approach, if a firm has entered local market with even a single sale, it has done so
after calculating the associated costs and thus, that is sufficient evidence to support the
claim that if the local market were to increase in profitability, the firm would then divert
additional units of product to that local market).
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Canada."' Thus, the diversion approach is able to remain flexible in
its measurements of the elasticity of supply." 8
In addition to its ability to deal', with future governmental barriers,
the diversion approach remains flexible in measuring the elasticity of
demand. 3 '9 Because U.S. pharmaceutical companies often own mo-
nopolies in the form of patents over their drugs, the demand for their
products is relatively inelastic. 32° Thus, in keeping with general eco-
nomic thinking, the U.S. pharmaceutical companies, as rational profit,
maximizing entities, will reduce the:quantity of goods sold to Canadian
pharmacies.321 This is because sales by Canadian pharmacies to U.S.
consumers cut into the profits drug manufacturers gain when U.S.
pharmacies sell the same product to the same U.S. consumer, but at a
higher, unregulated price. 322 By focusing on the elasticity of demand,
the diversion approach is able to capture the desire of Canadian phar-
macies to purchase prescription drugs from U.S. pharmaceutical com-
panies, even if the pharmaceutical companies refuse to sell (and there-
fore ship) any product. 323
In addition, the diversion approach is hest able to account for
demand from U.S. consumers. 324 By incorporating all Canadian sup-
pliers that supply even a single unit of prescription drugs to a U.S.
consumer, the diversion approach incorporates all sales of such sup-
pliers and thus more accurately assesses the cross-border flow of pre-
scription drug sales. 325 In this fashion, the diversion approach also
properly accounts for the large impact of online sales from Canadian
pharmacies to U.S. consumers.32° By contrast, the shipments ap-
proach, which accounts for only those suppliers that currently ship a
majority of their products to the defined market, would preclude in-
clusion of most Canadian pharmacies because their main consumers
are not U.S. customers—a rationale that ignores the dynamic reality
of prescription drug reimportation.327
517
 See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
318 See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
516 See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
526 Sec Landes & Posner, supra note 115, at 942.
521 See id.
322 See id.
523 See supra notes 156,162-67, and accompanying text.
324 See SUM notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
325 See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
926 See MOM notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
927 Sec supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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Because it maintains flexibility in accounting for both supply and
demand forces, the diversion approach is best capable of dealing with
the unique role of the Internet, a global market, and governmental
barriers in the reimportation of prescription drugs between Canada
and the United States.328
CONCLUSION
Although prescription drug reimportation, in the end, might not
be a long-term sustainable option for U.S. consumers aiming to re-
duce the cost of their prescriptions, the current practice has caused
enough concern among the pharmaceutical industry and consumers
that both sides have brought their concerns before U.S. courts. As
such, numerous questions regarding the current practice of geo-
graphic market definition exist when antitrust claims are raised with
respect to reimportation. In addition to the ambiguity surrounding
the existing methodologies for geographic market definition, the ad-
vancement of modern technologies—especially the Internet—is
changing how society views its "geography" and thus altering the legal
sense of market share based on a physical geographic definition.
Rooted in this unique setting, prescription drug reimportation pro-
vides an opportunity for courts to recognize the flexibility that the
diversion approach offers to geographic market definition. Unlike
other approaches, the diversion approach accurately captures the
relevant market forces while accommodating any potential govern-
mental barriers subsequently imposed by governments. In short, al-
though the issue of drug reimportation raises some unique considera-
tions under antitrust law, the traditional antitrust methodology and
analysis still can be adapted to ensure drug manufacturers' actions to
limit drug reimportation are subjected to antitrust oversight. In turn,
such oversight safeguards free competition to the benefit of all U.S.
consumers.
MARYAN M. CHIRAYATH
928 See supra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
